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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Economic politics on display at Boston Symposium 
At the U.S.-Russian Investment Symposium in Boston this week, certain clear 
difficulties and obstructions to trade, development, and investment in Russia 
emerged through the panels and discussions.  The WTO accession negotiations 
were a conspicuous focal point (with most participants arguing in favor of rapid 
accession) and demanded discussion of Russia's need to improve its protection 
of intellectual property rights, tighten banking regulations and general conformity 
with international norms, prevent capital flight (even if there are reasonable 
motives to move money out of the country), and, more broadly, develop as a rule 
of law state that has a truly independent judiciary, which applies its legal 
standards uniformly both to individuals and companies.  Negotiating the complex 
allies and footpaths of the Russian bureaucracies (national, regional, etc.) also 
represents an obvious impediment to regularized trade and, of course, daily life. 
 
While noting the difficulties in attaining the appropriate conditions for WTO 
accession, Russian First Deputy Minister of Trade and Economic Development, 
Andrei Sharonov, highlighted the need for diversification of streams of capital, 
and the danger of relying too heavily on the energy sector as the "golden goose," 
despite the many "golden eggs" it has produced. 
 
Minister Sharonov recommended the "commercialization of technological ideas," 
which would make use Russia's significant pool of expertise and trained 
specialist, particularly in high technology, biotechnology, and civilian aviation. 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering (currently senior vice president for international 
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relations at Boeing) echoed Sharonov's upbeat appraisal of the value of Russia's 
human and intellectual resources. 
 
Russia's political situation, from difficulties in executive-legislative cooperation to 
the coming parliamentary and presidential elections, serves as a backdrop for 
any consideration of short and long term planning, investment and development.  
Despite the impending succession, constitutionally required in 2008, participants 
in the Symposium reiterated a familiar Putin-era refrain: Political stability in 
Russia is the good newsŠand the bad news. 
 
Andrei Illarionov, Adviser to President Putin on Economic Affairs, delivered the 
keynote address and covered a range of elements crucial to doing business in 
Russia.  Perhaps the most fascinating aspects of his presentation consisted of 
the companies he chose to highlight his points:  RAO UES, which has seen 
comparatively small growth and fluctuating returns; and Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
Yukos, which, particularly prior to 2004, produced remarkable growth and 
returns.  Yukos, Illarionov noted, began investing in oil and politics, which was 
painful for certain members of the political establishment. Illarionov, somewhat 
dryly, noted that the attitude of the political authorities could prove a significant 
factor in any company's success. 
 
Asked during the question and answer session if he had presented his report to 
Anatoli Chubais, the Chair of RAO UES, Illarionov responded only that the 
management company of RAO UES that took over in 2001 had recently begun to 
pay attention to capitalization. 
 
Council on National Priorities 
On 21 October, President Putin decreed the creation of a council for the 
implementation of national priorities.  The composition of the Council includes 
Putin as Council Chairman; Head of the Kremlin Administration, Dmitri 
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Medvedev, as First Deputy Chair, with Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zhukov 
and Presidential Aide Igor Shuvalov as Deputy Chairmen.  (1) 
 
Other members of the council include select regional leaders (governors and 
mayors) and government ministers; the president's plenipotentiary 
representatives to the regions (including former Chief of the General Staff Anatoli 
Kvashnin); president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Yevgeni 
Primakov; presidential aides and academicians.  The Council specifically will 
address issues of healthcare, housing, construction, education and the agro-
industrial complex. (2) 
 
The Council's mission and composition suggests an attempt to circumvent or 
overlap governmental structures established to address these same priorities, 
but with an added impetus of direct presidential oversight and with regional 
implementation built-in through the president's plenipotentiary representatives 
and the chosen regional leaders.  A Nezavisimaya gazeta report suggests that 
Prime Minister Fradkov is the target of the creation of this Council.   However, 
this Council could be a natural extension of Putin's "strengthening of the power 
vertical" by subsuming a wide range of functions under direct presidential 
oversight. If Putin were directing an attack against Fradkov, it would seem he 
might pick a different playing field than that afforded by the new Council's brief.  
Indeed, if the President truly wanted to sideline the Prime Minister, he might have 
put Fradkov in charge of the agro-industrial complex; it is a time-honored 
tradition, after all. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ITAR-TASS, 21 Oct 05, 0551 EST; FBIS Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection (WNC). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 Oct 05; FBIS Translated text via WNC. 
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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By John Kafer 
 
Russian Security Services respond to Nalchik attack 
Recent History 
In light of questions raised about the effectiveness of Russian security forces¹ 
response to previous high-profile terrorist attacks, a review of their recent 
conduct during the 13 October militant attack in Nalchik clearly is warranted.  
While not quite a repeat of previous encounters, the recent Nalchik attack 
targeted armed Russian security forces where previous high-profile attacks 
centered on hostage-taking events, the reaction and performance of Russian 
security forces bear similar resemblances.  Each of the events indicates a 
particularly repressive and brutal response by security forces that terrorists argue 
reflects the behavior which led the militants to take extreme measures in the first 
place. (1) 
 
Russia¹s security forces seem plagued by incompetence and extremely 
disproportionate response.  During the infamous Nord-Ost Theater attack in 
October 2002, 50 terrorists held 800 Russians hostage.  The FSB response was 
uncoordinated, poorly-planned and culminated in the release of an as-yet-
unknown gas, which claimed the lives of 120 hostages; all 50 terrorists were 
killed, ³mostly with well-placed shots to the head.² (2)  In the September 2004 
attack at the Beslan school, at least 32 terrorists held 1200 hostages.  Three 
days into the crisis, security forces stormed the school with indiscriminate firing 
from tanks, flamethrowers, and grenades killing 331 hostages, including 170 
children and all but one terrorist. (3)  The security forces non-proportional 
responses appear more as a matter of routine than exceptions for high-profile 
hostage situations; the flattening of houses with tanks to get the terrorists inside 
also has become a standard operating procedure. (4)  
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Events in Nalchik 
At 3:00 am on the morning of 13 October, Internal Affairs troops encountered a 
group of armed militants in Nalchik, killing three and wounding seven of them. (5)  
Several hours later (reports continue to vary on the specific time of the attack, 
precise number of targets and the number of targets hit), between 9:30 and 
10:00, somewhere between 60 and several hundred militants simultaneously 
attacked 12-15 local Interior Ministry (MVD) buildings, Internal Affairs Department 
(OVD) buildings, FSB buildings, a military garrison near the airport, a military 
enlistment office, and a Border Troops section.  The attackers primarily used 
automatic weapons and grenades. (6)  Within an hour, air contact with Nalchik 
was cut off, stifling information, except from official sources, as to precisely what 
happened thereafter.  
 
Despite limited media reports, it is clear that confusion reigned among the 
security forces for several hours.  At 1:00 pm, Dmitri Kozak, the Presidential 
Envoy to the Southern Federal District, arrived in Nalchik and stated that security 
forces had managed to control the situation.   Various reports widely contradict 
his assessment; for several hours, security forces apparently reacted with a 
limited response, enabling most of the attackers to escape the city.  At 2:00 pm, 
reports arrived that attackers, some wounded, were holed up in two locations, an 
OVD building and the Podarki store, near an FSB building.  By 10:00 pm MVD 
reported that all fighters inside have been killed and all hostages freed; however 
other reports suggest some hostages were held until the following morning. (7)  
Individual stories and reports raise questions regarding the conduct and 
effectiveness of the security forces.  
 
Most analysts agree that Moscow¹s heavy-handiness in the Caucasus regions is 
causing extremist reactions among the population and that might have spurred 
the Nalchik attack.  The newly-elected President of the Kabardino-Balkaria 
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Republic, Arsen Kanokov, agreed, stating that Russian officials may be guilty of 
³certain excesses² including closing Mosques and mistreating Muslims. (8)  
 
Given the choice of targets, the militants seemed intent on attacking the security 
forces directly, but also chose targets of opportunity, including civilians.  The 
security forces¹ response to the hostage situations displayed a total lack of 
regard for the hostages.  One former hostage, a local police captain who was 
lucky to survive, reports that armored personnel carriers arrived and began to 
³hammer away,² constantly hitting the second floor where the hostages were 
located while most of the attackers were on the first floor. (9)  In a separate 
hostage situation that lasted until the following morning, a witness reported that 
Spetsnaz troops, under cover of heavy machine gun fire ³pumped round after 
round of grenades² into a small shop for 30 minutes where militants had taken 
hostages. (10)  Security forces subsequently reported to the press that all 
hostages had been freed.  Another surviving hostage reported Russian troops 
stormed a store after firing gas grenades to kill militants who were already too 
weak to resist.  The surviving hostages suffered from the effects of an 
³unspecified gas.² (11)   
 
The Fallout 
Russian officials have a history of overstating the number of ³enemy² killed and 
underestimating their own losses.  Reports from Nalchik raise intriguing 
questions.  On 14 October, officials reported 61 militants killed and 27 captured. 
(12)  One week later officials reported 92 killed and 13 captured, with only 12 
civilians killed and no explanation for the reported increase in persons killed or 
reduction in those captured.  (13)  Seasoned military analysts recognize that 
wounded in action typically far exceed those killed in action.  Russian officials 
claim 24 security personnel were killed while over 100 were wounded, a similarly 
high ratio of wounded to killed. (14)  Meanwhile, Chechen warlord, Shamil 
Basayev, who claimed responsibility for organizing the attack, reported only 41 
militants were killed. (15)  Other reports that indicate ³all the dead terrorists have 
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holes in the back of their heads² and that a large number of innocent bystanders 
were captured by Russian security forces. (16)  Reported revenge attacks 
against the population may go a long way to explaining the disproportionate 
number of ³militants² killed versus those captured.  
 
A former KGB Colonel, Sergei Goncharov, accurately assessed the status of 
Russia¹s elite antiterrorism forces, ³Everywhere there is pervasive corruption and 
complete treachery.  It is laughable to talk about fighting terror.² (17)  Indeed, 
Russian security services¹ and armed forces¹ total disregard for human rights 
and treatment of prisoners, against any accepted international norms, has not 
resulted in subordination of the population to the will of Moscow.  On the 
contrary, such actions have now spread the violence from Chechnya throughout 
the entire Caucasus.  Russian President Vladimir Putin fuels the instability with 
statements of praise for the security forces like, ³It's great that all of the law 
enforcement and power agencies acted in a coordinated, effective and ruthless 
manner.² (18)  Given this level of support for unprofessional, undisciplined, 
ruthless actions by security forces against its own citizens, Russia cannot hope 
to achieve either pacification of the populations in its Caucasus republics or 
stability.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Why Kabardino-Balkaria is Becoming a Second Dagestan² by Paul Goble, 
Window on Eurasia, 19 Oct 05 via Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL) #9271. 
(2) See ³Security Services² The NIS Observed: an Analytical Review, Vol. VII, 
No. 19, 4 Dec 02. 
(3) ³Beslan: Russia¹s 9/11?² by John B. Dunlop, 12 Oct 05 available at 
http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/Beslan.pdf 
(4) See ³Security Services² The NIS Observed: an Analytical Review, Vol. X, No. 
3, 4 Mar 05. 
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(5) ³Background, Possible Motives for Nalchik Terrorist Attack Explored,² 
Izvestia, 21 Oct O5, via JRL #9276. 
(6) Ibid, and ³Nalchik Under Attack: Moscow Unable to Respond² by Andrei 
Smirnov, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 Oct 05, Vol 2, Issue 191.  
(7) Ibid. 
(8) ³Why Kabardino-Balkaria is Becoming a Second Dagestan² by Paul Goble, 
Window on Eurasia, 19 Oct 05, via JRL #9271. 
(9) ³Background, Possible Motives for Nalchik Terrorist Attack Explored,² 
Izvestia, 21 Oct O5, via JRL #9276. 
(10) ³In the Line of Fire² by Paul Quinn-Judge,² Time Europe, 24 Oct 05, via JRL 
#9268. 
(11) ³Hostage in Russia Attacks Recalls Ordeal² by Mike Eckel and Fatima 
Tlisova, JRL #9268, 15 Oct 05.  
(12) ³Questions Remain Over Militants¹ Nationality, Numbers,² Ria Novosti, 14 
Oct 05, via RFERL NEWSLINE. 
(13) ³Background, Possible Motives for Nalchik Terrorist Attack Explored,² 
Izvestia, 21 Oct O5, via JRL #9276. 
(14) ³Nalchik² by Pavel Felgenhauer, JRL #9271. 
(15) ³Basayev Says He Arranged ŒBotched¹ Raid² by Nabi Abdullaev, The 
Moscow Times, 18 Oct 05 via ISI Emerging Markets.  
(16) ³Background, Possible Motives for Nalchik Terrorist Attack Explored,² 
Izvestia, 21 Oct O5, via JRL #9276. 
(17) Experts Consider Raid to be Political and Intelligence Failure,² ej.ru, 14 Oct 
05 via RFEFL NEWSLINE.  
(18) ³Putin Praises ŒRuthless¹ Operation² by Nabi Abdullaev, The Moscow 
Times, 17 Oct 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Robyn Angley 
 
Wolfowitz goes to Moscow 
Paul Wolfowitz visited Russia for two days in October as part of his first official 
trip since formally assuming leadership of the World Bank. Wolfowitz¹s other 
destinations included China and Japan. A key issue for discussions between 
Wolfowitz and President Vladimir Putin was the potential for Russia to make 
economic development a top priority when it assumes chairmanship of the G8 
next year. Wolfowitz also met with Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov to discuss 
judicial reforms and stressed the importance of addressing prevalent corruption 
within Russia¹s state and society.  
 
In keeping with previously expressed World Bank concerns, Wolfowitz urged 
Putin not to waste the money from the Stabilization Fund (the account set up to 
hold the extra income the state has received in the last several years because of 
high world energy prices). The state has come under increasing pressure to use 
the Stabilization Fund to ease the pain of some of its social policies, not least of 
which was the monetization of pensions issue in January. The state dipped into 
the fund to boost military pensions after protests last winter. 
 
In line with recent World Bank trends that view the Bank as an exporter of ideas 
as well as capital, the new World Bank president commented on the changing 
nature of the Russia-World Bank relationship. ³The World Bank Group's role in 
Russia has evolved over time. Today our partnership is less about money and 
more about the transfer of ideas and expertise to address key priorities in health, 
education, regional development and the fostering of public-private partnerships,² 
said Wolfowitz. (1)  Relations between Russia and international financial 
institutions hit an all-time low during the 1998 ruble crisis when Russia defaulted 
on its loans and the International Monetary Fund responded to the crisis by 
offering too little help, too late. In the intervening years, Russia has not taken 
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concerns by these organizations very seriously; nonetheless, the World Bank 
currently has a number of active projects in Russia. 
 
Wolfowitz raised an interesting possibility when he discussed the prospect of 
World Bank lending to Russia¹s regions. "As far as I know,² said Putin after his 
meeting with Wolfowitz, ³the World Bank is examining the possibility to offer 
financial resources to Russian regions even without guarantees of the federal 
centre.² (2)  Access by the regions to capital from the World Bank apart from 
approval by the Kremlin could introduce an interesting dynamic into the ongoing 
struggle between a centralized state and regional authorities. 
 
On a related economic note, predictions about when Russia will join the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) are varied and often contradictory. Unwieldy 
negotiations with the United States about trade barriers constitute a significant 
step that must be completed before Russia¹s accession to the WTO can move 
forward. However, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, William Berns, has said that he 
hopes trade negotiations with the United States can be concluded by the end of 
the year, provided Congress cooperates. (3) 
 
Moscow elections 
Elections to Moscow City Duma¹s 35 seats will be held on December 4. These 
elections assume added significance in light of the fact that the City Duma will be 
responsible for appointing the next mayor of Moscow. The incumbent, Yuri 
Luzkhov, is standing for election to the City Duma and will be stepping down as 
mayor. 
 
The City Duma elections are set up similarly to the old State Duma elections that 
were replaced earlier this year. Twenty seats are elected on the proportional 
representation system, while 15 are chosen on the basis of single-mandate 
districts. There is a 10 percent threshold (of the vote) for participation in the 
distribution of proportional representation seats. This threshold has been 
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criticized by the Central Electoral Commission Chair Aleksandr Veshnyakov 
because it contravenes a federal law stipulating that regional legislatures have 
thresholds for participation not exceeding 7 percent. The ³against all² option has 
been removed from the ballot this year. Additionally, the city Duma must be 
composed of at least two political parties by law, even if the second party fails to 
clear the threshold for participation. The minimum voter turnout has recently 
been lowered from 25 to 20 percent. 
 
The dominant party in the elections is United Russia. Yuri Luzkhov has teamed 
up with the favored party and will lead its party list. The Communists, the political 
party that historically has the strongest base, tends to perform less favorably in 
Moscow. It is stronger in the regions and among certain social groups, such as 
the pensioners. The liberal parties, on the other hand, receive more support in 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg than they do regionally and can be expected to 
clear the threshold, something they may not be able to do when it is time for 
elections to the State Duma. 
 
The liberal parties Yabloko and Union of Right Forces (SPS) are contesting the 
elections jointly under the Yabloko name. Yabloko has not placed its more 
notable members such as Grigori Yavlinsky at the top of its list. Instead, the 
combined Yabloko party has decided, according to Nikita Belykh, head of SPS, 
to rely on ³current members of the Moscow City Duma, who can and will work 
professionally in the City Duma, while Grigori Alexeyevich and me would act as 
agents. That is, we would be able to take part in debates, speak about this 
campaign, thus giving it federal significance.² (4)  This decision may hurt the 
group that has been cobbled together to contest the elections, since it has 
typically been the name recognition of politicians that has drawn support in 
Russia, rather than a particular party platform. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) ³President Wolfowitz: Discovering Russia's new role in global development² 
via 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20691351
~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html 
(2) ³Fradkov, Wolfowitz discuss prospects for RF-WB cooperation,² 20 Oct 05, 
ITAR-TASS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) ³U.S. ambassador wants speedy end to WTO talks with Russia,² 20 Oct 05, 
Interfax; FBIS Transcribed text via World News Connection (WNC). 
(4) ³Press conference with Yabloko leader Grigori Yavlinsky and Right Forces 
Union leader Nikita Belykh,² 28 Sep 05, Interfax; Official Kremlin Int'l News 
Broadcast via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Marcel LeBlanc and Jeffrey Butler 
 
INTERNAL 
Military industry: exports, imports and the future 
The Russian arms sales sector complex continues a strong push for export 
markets as it fights for survival.  Russian military hardware and services have 
been displayed prominently in military exercises and trade shows with the aim of 
generating business.  The aviation industry received a boost following the Peace 
2005 joint military exercises as China placed an order for nearly 40 Russian air 
lifters and air-refueling tankers worth over one billion dollars. (1)  In addition, the 
MAKs 2005 Air Show near Moscow provided the opportunity to view virtually 
every available Russian fighter including the experimental SU-47 fifth generation 
fighter. (2)  Russian naval exports are also expected to rise in the near future as 
Asian and Middle Eastern nations upgrade their navies.  The 2nd International 
Naval Systems Show (July 2005, St Petersburg) was considered particularly 
successful as several contracts for Russian submarines and warships are 
expected from China, India, Indonesia, and other countries. (3)  
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In general, Russian military exports have increased in the last few years as 
global arms sales have increased worldwide.  The United States remains the 
largest arms exporter in terms of net sales, with Russia coming in second with 
well over $5 billion in sales in 2004 and nearly $6 billion expected in 2005.  China 
and India represent eighty percent of Russia¹s export market, and the defense 
industry is reaching out to potential new markets in virtually every corner of the 
globe in order to increase revenue. (4) 
 
Funding for defense procurement is also slated to increase in 2006.  Nearly $6 
billion is budgeted for defense procurement, which would results in a rare 
balance, with the defense industry potentially receiving as much funding from the 
Ministry of Defense and is does from foreign customers. 
 
The numbers don¹t always tell the whole story 
Despite the recent increase in exports and domestic funding, Russia¹s military 
industrial complex remains in a state of significant distress.  The privatization 
plans of the past decade were unmitigated failures.  Unscrupulous and 
unsupervised government officials and investors raided military industries during 
the shock therapy of the 1990¹s. (5)  Even today nearly one third of defense 
industries is bankrupt with most others in poor financial straits. (6)  Labor issues 
in the defense sector abound with fears of strikes and labor demonstrations 
imminent.  The low wages and disorganization of the defense industry is 
depleting the workforce of talent.  Experienced workers are leaving for greener 
pastures and young replacements are not forthcoming.  For example, the 
average age of the defense sector worker is reported to be 54, with specialists 
even older at 57 years old. (7).  Combined with Russia¹s already grim 
demographic trends and population loss, the aging of the defense industry 
workforce will be difficult to correct considering the low wages and profit margins. 
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The planned consolidation of the defense industry constitutes a move in the right 
direction; however, the record of past performance for instituting defense reforms 
is not encouraging.  Plans to merge various aspects of the defense industry into 
large holdings with government oversight are preferable to the free for all 
currently in existence.  Some of the benefits of this plan are to increase oversight 
for effective regulation and streamline operations to increase efficiency. (8)  
Unfortunately, there is still too much resistance to change and not enough 
urgency to engender genuine optimism.  Progress on previous reforms has been 
tortuously slow.  For the period of 2002 until 2004, only three of the 75 planned 
integrated business structures were completed. (9)  Moreover, many of the 
legacy companies are hesitant or financially unable to downsize and modernize 
their Soviet-era facilities which leads to continued inefficiencies. (10) 
 
Aside from labor unrest and poor organization, the defense industry also suffers 
from a tenuous relationship with the Ministry of Defense.  The bottom line is that 
much of the money earmarked by the MoD never reaches industry. (11)  In 
October 2005, a new organization, the Federal Defense Order Service, was 
established to be the single monitor for defense contracts.  Prior to this, 
accountability for funds and product delivery was highly decentralized in the 
government leading to a corrupt system with a well known legacy of bribes and 
embezzlement (12). 
 
Transparency is not an adjective usually associated with Russian defense 
spending, however, sources estimate that of the approximately $6 billion 
allocated for procurement, $3 billion goes to nuclear forces, and the rest is 
distributed thinly to the rest of the defense industry, supporting conventional 
forces and space. (13)  There is little tangible return for this investment as only 
30 tanks and seven aircraft were delivered to the MoD in 2004, and the vast 
majority of product generated by the defense industry is sent overseas (14).  
Corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of consistent funding apparently 
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conspire to squander the MoD¹s investment in modernizing the conventional 
forces.     
 
The international arms market has been the best source of revenue for the 
defense industry in the past few years, but the long term outlook is cloudy.  China 
and India account for the vast majority of Russian defense exports, and both 
countries will diversify their arms imports in the future.  China is actively courting 
European Union countries to acquire technology not available from Russia, and it 
is possible that the EU arms embargo on China may not continue much longer. 
(15)  China also has shrewdly acquired licensing rights for much of the imported 
Russian technology and is in the process of nurturing its indigenous defense 
industry (16).  India also is diversifying its arms sources and recently received 
approval to consider U.S. and European fighters in an upcoming bid to purchase 
replacements for its aging fleet of Russian fighters. (17)  The failure of the 
Russian defense industry to modernize and keep pace with the revolution in 
military affairs already is having a negative impact and will steadily devalue their 
arms relative to other competitors. 
 
The plight of the defense industry has not gone unnoticed by Russia¹s military 
leaders.  Senior ranking officers in all of the service branches are alarmed by the 
"permanent under funding of the country's defense requirements." (18)  The 
commander of Russia's Space Forces commented on defense funding:  "There 
has been an increase in budget funding Š but if you consider the growth of 
inflation, then this is, rather, horizontal development.² (19)  In other words, there 
is enough money to keep the establishment from falling apart in the short term, 
but not nearly enough funding and priority to effect genuine reform and 
restructuring for long term health.   
 
Conclusion 
The defense industry continues to struggle in an effort to restructure and 
modernize its operations and technology.  Meager funding from the Ministry of 
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Defense has contributed to failure, as has the inability to remold the expansive 
Soviet-era defense industry into a smaller, more efficient enterprise suited for the 
Russian Federation.  Current promises to reform the defense industry and 
provide more funding appear to be more talk than action and do not bode well for 
true change and improvement.  The critical issues of the 2008 elections have 
captured the attention of Putin and other civilian elites which has led to a de-
emphasis on military reform. 
 
The declining competitiveness and desperation of the Russian defense industry 
will increase pressure sell ever more complex and controversial arms to legally 
(and illegally) to countries such as China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea where 
western competition is curtailed by legal or ethical constraints.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Military-transport aircraft will cost China a billion dollars,² Gazeta, 9 Sep 05, 
WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) ³Unexpected success of the MAKS-2005 air show², RIA Novosti, 22 Aug 05 
via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) ³Defense Industry Boosts Naval Exports,² Rossiiskiye vesti, No. 33, 26 Sep 
05, WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(4) ³Russian Military Industrial Complex Is On The Brink Of Collapse,² WPS 
Russian Business Monitor, 17 Jun 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(5) ³Russian defence industry privatization damaged national security,² Krasnaya 
zvezda, Moscow, 24 Dec 20; BBC World Wide monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) ³One-third of Russian defense enterprises are broke,² RIA Novosti, 29 Jul 05 
via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) ³Consolidated Aircraft Company: Pros And Cons,² RIA Novosti, 29 March 05 
via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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(9) ³Military-Industrial Complex: Crisis Or Recovery,² Nezavisimoe voennoe 
obozrenie, No. 27, 22 Jul 20; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) ³The Defense Sector's Last Chance,² Ekspert, No. 4, 31 Jan 05; WPS 
Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Ibid.; ³The Ministry Of Accounting Defense,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 Oct 
05; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) ³Russia Isn't Really Developing Its Armed Forces At All,² Vremya novostei, 9 
Aug 05; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) ³Ending The EU Arms Embargo: The Repercussions For Russia,² 
Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Volume 5, Issue 7, 29 Mar 05. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) ³India prepares RFP for fighters,² Flight International, 11 Oct 05, Reed 
Business Information via Lexis-Nexis. 
(18) ³Achilles' Heel of Defense. Regime's Inability To Carry Out Military Reform Is 
Pushing Generals Into Ranks of Opposition,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 Oct 05 
via Johnson¹s Russia List. 
(19) Ibid. 
 
EXTERNAL 
Joint naval forces in the Caspian 
In a televised briefing on October 24, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei 
Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin discussed their desire for a joint Caspian 
Sea force. (1) This very public brief signaled Russia¹s commitment to an idea 
that Russian officials have been promoting for almost a year. What Russian 
leaders envision is a joint naval force that would provide ³protection against 
terrorism and trafficking in arms, narcotics and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)² in the Caspian region. (2) Comprised of navies from the five states 
bordering the Caspian, this joint naval grouping would be called CasFor for short. 
 
 18 
Although the threats CasFor would conceivably face are legitimate, they are not 
new.  In fact, until this year, Russia seemed content to address these threats with 
the status quo of forces in the Caspian.  However, when U.S. offers to modernize 
the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani navies foreshadowed change in that status quo, 
Russia¹s leaders responded with a vigorous promotion of CasFor. If it is made a 
reality, this joint naval force will not alter naval capability in the Caspian, but it will 
affect the interests of Russia, Iran, and the United States. 
 
The Caspian: current issues, status of forces 
The Caspian Sea covers an area nearly the size of California and it touches the 
shores of five countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and 
Azerbaijan. Although it is termed ³landlocked,² this body of water is accessible 
via a canal linked to the Black Sea.  However, its significance lies in large 
deposits of oil and gas beneath its waters (20 to 40 billion barrels of proven oil 
reserves) and in its usefulness as a route for trade - both legal and illegal - 
between its five border countries. (3) Because these five border countries cannot 
agree on whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake, they have interpreted 
international law differently when divvying up the Caspian¹s valuable resources 
and trade routes.  At present, only Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan have 
reached consensus. (4) A joint naval force headed by Russia would help them to 
solidify their control of the Caspian – regardless the outcome of the sea-or-lake 
issue. 
 
Since 1992, each of the Caspian¹s border nations has been represented by 
some form of flotilla.  For Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan 
these flotillas were born of a re-distribution of ex-Soviet assets that left Russia 
with the largest fleet, Azerbaijan a distant second and both Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan with only honorable mention status. (5) Meanwhile, Iran focused 
on its navy in the Arabian Sea, leaving only a small presence in the Caspian -- 
some patrol boats and a minesweeper based at Bandar-e Anzelli. (6) When 
compared to navies in similar bodies of water, like the Black Sea for example, the 
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five Caspian flotillas were below average in numbers and strength.  Still, these 
flotillas matched the threat presented by smugglers, illegal trade, and other 
criminal activity.  More importantly, Russia was happy with its position as the sole 
influence in the region.  In fact, in 2003, it did not ³envisage any kind of new 
military presence in the Caspian.² (7)  However, the Russians would change this 
thinking less than two years later.  
 
Russia¹s newfound Caspian Sea desires 
When the United States expressed interest in upgrading both the Azerbaijani and 
Kazakhstani navies in 2005, Russia began to express publicly its desire for a 
joint naval force in the Caspian. In April sources at the Russian Defense Ministry 
leaked plans for the development of a ³rapid reaction force² to be deployed to the 
region.  Most telling in this report was mention of Russia¹s expressed intent to 
³forbid the presence of other countries¹ armed forces in the region – countries 
that do not have direct access to the sea.² (8) This theme would be repeated 
over the next six months as Russian naval commanders and political leaders 
continued to lobby for CasFor. 
 
The pace of Russia¹s CasFor campaign accelerated in July when Russian 
delegates chaired an ³unofficial² conference with representatives from each of 
the five Caspian states.  The conference broached the subject of forming a joint 
naval group in the region, and it laid the groundwork for further discussion in the 
fall. (9) 
 
In October, diplomats expanded on the navy¹s efforts.  First, at an October 6 
meeting ostensibly to discuss the Caspian¹s legal status, Russian ministers spent 
significant effort promoting the creation of a ³unified naval operations group² in 
the Caspian. (10) Second, during visits with Turkmenistan President Niyazov and 
Iran¹s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
seemed to garner more support for a CasFor concept. (11) But, diplomatic and 
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military efforts notwithstanding, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Iran still needed 
more coaxing.  
 
Courting Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Iran 
Azerbaijan turned down offers to participate in CasFor.  In fact, Azerbaijani 
representatives revisited Russia¹s 2003 theme of ³demilitarization² of the 
Caspian. (12)  Azerbaijan¹s stance likely had roots in the (U.S.) $30 million spent 
by the United States to upgrade radar facilities on the Azerbaijan coast 
(strategically located near Iran¹s border) and to repair ships and train personnel 
in the Azerbaijan Navy. (13) Even though this U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan did 
not threaten Russia¹s naval dominance among Caspian flotillas, it could 
challenge the Russian government¹s regional influence. By promoting CasFor to 
the Azerbaijani¹s, Russia seeks to re-capture that influence. 
 
In conjunction with offers to Azerbaijan, the U.S. also has made non-specific 
offers to modernize Kazakhstan¹s navy. (14) Consequently, Kazakhstan seems 
as hesitant about CasFor as Azerbaijan does. It is notable also that 
Kazakhstan¹s Caspian flotilla is far behind Azerbaijan¹s in capability, so, as far as 
the Russian Navy is concerned, any ³modernization² the U.S. undertakes for 
Kazakhstan would have less effect than would an upgrade of Azerbaijan¹s force. 
This is further evidence that Russia¹s desire to join naval forces with Kazakhstan 
is more political than military. 
 
Iran is a different story.  Of the five Caspian flotillas, Iran¹s is the fourth largest, 
with just a few patrol boats and a minesweeper.  Nonetheless, Putin made a 
specific effort to include Iran in CasFor. (15) Although Iran has supported the 
concept only with trepidation, Russia continues to press for its cooperation. 
Again, like that of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, an Iranian flotilla would not add 
much capability to CasFor. Yet the Russians remain committed to the CasFor 
concept, even going so far as to bundle Iranian participation with the push-button 
issues of arms sales and nuclear non-proliferation compliance (or 
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noncompliance). (16) Given the current state of U.S.-Iran relations, Russia¹s 
overtures seem unnecessary. Still, Iranian President Ahmadinejad recently 
expressed support for Russia¹s Caspian Sea philosophy, and thereby rewarded 
Russia¹s persistence in the matter. (17) 
 
November and beyond 
A working commission on CasFor will meet in Moscow on 22 November. (18)  
The goal of this commission will be to flesh out the details of the proposed joint 
naval force.  Given the status of the other four flotillas, there is no doubt the 
Russian navy would comprise the bulk of CasFor – in equipment, personnel, 
command and facilities.  Most importantly, the Russians have stated already and 
will continue to pursue aggressively their goal of ³maintaining regional 
securityŠwithout involvement of armed forces of third countries.² (19) To 
accomplish this, Russia will need Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani compliance, at the 
expense of U.S. interests and commitments. To entice Iran, the Russians likely 
will continue their ³carrot² approach by promising to improve Iran¹s Caspian fleet 
through arms sales and by offering to act as Iran¹s mediator in the international 
arena.  If the five Caspian players agree on Russia¹s CasFor proposal, the formal 
naval balance in the Caspian would remain unchanged while, by excluding the 
U.S., the Russians would tilt the strategic balance strongly in their favor. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Kate Martin 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Trouble with a capital T, that rhymes with V, that stands for Voting 
It¹s not easy to be Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev – there are crowds 
protesting in the capital, even when you tell them not to; there are international 
observers decrying ³excessive force² used by police against those disobedient 
demonstrators; no one will help you arrest a political rival with substantial support 
among the populace; and there¹s the specter of a coup plot running, apparently, 
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rampant, throughout your administration.  In the run-up to the November 6 
parliamentary elections, what¹s a president to do? 
 
Well, this president is going to offer the Azeri people firm words about the need 
for democracy, some bland reassurances that innocent people were not beaten 
by police and security officers, and a last-minute change of heart about allowing 
observers into Azerbaijan.  ³We want our country to become more democratic 
and our society to become freer.  In this light, free elections meet everyone¹s 
interests,² Aliyev said. (1)   He also called for lifting the ban on having observers 
from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with more than 30% foreign 
involvement; the late date of the introduction to parliament of the necessary 
amendment, and parliament¹s acceptance, presumably will preclude many NGOs 
sending in teams, however. (2)  Still, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe did announce that it will send 47 observers. (3)  That should make 
everything better. 
 
Unless, of course, you are one of the hundreds who massed on the streets of 
Baku in any number of protest rallies in October, culminating in mass arrests on 
October 17.   On that day, supporters of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan were 
arrested, and police reportedly beat on a car after a bunch of carnations was 
thrown from it. (The ³Red Revolution²?)  Moreover, several hundred internal 
troops were deployed across Baku international airport, (4) in response to 
expectations that Democratic Party chairman (and former parliamentary speaker) 
Rasul Quliyev, who is serving as a lightning rod for opponents to Aliyev¹s 
government, would be returning to Azerbaijan.  Baku has charged Quliyev with 
embezzlement of state property and placed him on an international wanted list; 
however, a Ukrainian court determined there was insufficient evidence to warrant 
his extradition to Azerbaijan. (5)  Interestingly, both the government and Quliyev 
want him back in Baku, but under vastly different scenarios – Quliyev is seeking 
a parliamentary seat (with parliamentary immunity, of course), while Baku wants 
him jailed.  
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Yet recent actions by Baku appear to be fanning the flames of opposition, rather 
than quelling them.  Reports were issued on the arrest and beating of Quliyev¹s 
lawyer, Samo Arif, and  parliamentary candidates Akif Soltanov and Novruz 
Salahov; the kidnapping of relatives of Quliyev; and the detention of 
parliamentary candidate (and party deputy chair) Sovkat Balayeva, newspaper 
editor Aydin Quliyev and other party activists. (6) 
 
International condemnation to earlier suppressions of rallies and the October 17 
sweep was widespread and clear – Max Boot, the chairman of the U.S. Council 
on Foreign Relations, told a conference in Baku that the U.S. condemned the use 
of police against the protesters, and placed high importance on guarantees of 
democracy in the upcoming elections. (7)  Several days later, the head of the 
Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in 
Baku, Maurizio Pavesi, asked Baku to ³explain the necessity of operations 
carried out by security forces in order to avert a further aggravation of the already 
tense political atmosphere in Azerbaijan. Š We are concerned about the growing 
rate of violence, the unmotivated and exaggerated use of force against 
demonstrators, arrests and detentions.² (8)  The European Union praised the 
president¹s resolution to open up the election to observers but noted the 
³belated² nature of that resolution as well as its deep concern about the mass 
arrests and the excessive force used by police against opposition supporters.  (9) 
 
And yet, police in Baku reportedly detained another several dozen participants of 
an unauthorized rally of hundreds of protesters held by the opposition alliance 
Azadlyg (Freedom) – consisting of the Democratic Party, Musavat and the 
Popular front of Azerbaijan –  on October 23.   Police Chief Yashar Aliyev told 
reporters that violence was not used, and that the police ³acted in a civilized 
manner.² (10)  
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Being (or having been) in the government is no protection from legal action 
either, it seems:  the Aliyev government and security services rounded up several 
ministers and former ministers in one week, charging them with planning a coup.  
The former Minister for Economic Development, Farkhad Aliyev, was detained on 
October 20, along with his brother, Rafik, the director of the AZPETROL 
company. (11)  So was Health Minister Ali Insanov, who had been first relieved of 
his duties. (12)  Charges were pending against the newly dismissed Labor and 
Social Security Minister, Ali Nagiyev, Education Minister Misir Mardanov, and 
presidential property manager Akif Muradverdiyev. (13) The alleged coup 
planners were colluding with Quliyev, the prosecutor general¹s office charged. 
(14)  And withdrawing from the parliamentary race did not protect the head of the 
state-owned Azerkhimia company, Fikret Sadykov, who was detained on October 
23.  (15)  Sadykov, an MP, cannot be charged without parliamentary approval 
due to the immunity his position grants him.  
 
Azadlyg has denied any plans for a coup, issuing a statement that ³the alliance 
has been using solely peaceful methods, relying on the constitution and other 
laws of Azerbaijan guaranteeing freedom of assembly.² (16) 
 
What does this mean for democracy in Azerbaijan?  It clearly has not developed 
into a fully functioning system as yet.  And Ilham Aliyev, who basically inherited 
his position as president from his father, the late Geydar Aliyev, needs to review 
some basic Democracy and You manuals, to understand that sometimes, 
Change Happens. 
 
CHECHNYA 
A role model for democracy? Not yet. 
Meanwhile, 367 candidates registered through October 22 for parliamentary 
elections that will be held in Chechnya on November 27. (17)   Representatives 
of most of Russia¹s national parties will be on the ballot, for party seats and/or 
single-mandate constituencies, including the United Russia party, Yabloko, 
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Rodina (Motherland), Right-Wing Forces Union SPS, the Communist Party, the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), the Eurasian Union, and the People¹s Will 
party.  The Republic Party, on the other hand, was excluded by the Chechen 
Electoral Commission because over 20 percent of the voter signatures on the 
registration forms were invalidated.  (18) 
 
A document issued by the Memorial Human Rights Center warns that, due to 
such problems as kidnappings, violence, security questions and law and order 
issues, the elections are unlikely to be ³free and fair.²  Moreover, ³the center is 
forced to say that these elections are not likely to be a step towards peace in the 
Northern Caucasus.² (19) 
 
Chechen President Alu Alkhanov said that the situation regarding security in the 
region is improving, and is ³under the control of power-wielding structures.²(20)  
And Chechen Interior Minister Ruslan Alkhanov reported that the ³rate of solved 
acts of terrorism has more than doubled - over 65% of such crimes were solved 
in January-September 2005 as compared to 26% a year ago," he said. "Four 
hundred and thirty-one suspects on federal and local wanted lists have been 
found." (21) 
 
However, others – notably, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) – disagree.  According to OSCE Chairman Dmitri Rupel, the 
group will not be sending observers to Chechnya for security reasons and for 
considerations related to freedom of access to polling stations throughout the 
republic. (22)  An interesting response to such concerns came from the Interior 
Ministry spokesman, Ruslan Atsayev, who announced that almost all of the 
ministry¹s personnel – and there are more than 15,000 individuals on the rosters 
– will be employed to guarantee security. (23).  Ah, happiness really is a warm 
gun. 
 
GEORGIA 
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Georgia turns to the West for help with breakaways 
Having already passed a resolution demanding an increase in the effectiveness 
of the ³peacekeeping² forces in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Ajaria, the Georgian government is now requesting backup from the 
United States.  The chances of success, however, seem slim.  U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried told journalists 
that ³Russia should participate in the South Ossetian conflict settlement, where it 
can play a constructive role.² (24)  Yet slim chances are still chances:  Fried did 
not say that Russia ³has been playing² a constructive role; merely, that it could 
play such a role.  And consultations with the United States are ongoing, 
according to Separatist Conflicts Minister Giorgi Khaindrava. (25) 
 
Tbilisi certainly will not be getting any backing of its demand from Russia, which 
maintains its stand that only the ³well-coordinated functioning of the Joint Control 
Commission and the selfless contribution by Russian peacekeepers² have kept 
the situation in the conflict zone under control, as Russia¹s envoy to the OSCE, 
Alexei Borodavkin, explained. (26)  Borodavkin reiterated the oft-made claim that 
Georgia is the aggressor trying to provocatively alter the situation in the 
breakaway republics.  And yet, the Russian chairman of the Joint Control 
Commission purportedly tasked with finding a solution to the conflict apparently 
sees only one solution: acquiescence by Georgia.  Valeri Kenyaikin explained 
that, despite Tbilisi¹s refusal to accept separatist South Ossetia¹s independence, 
it was ³necessary to begin work on creating a zone of most favoured nation 
treatment.² (27)  He seems to have difficulty comprehending that such an 
agreement would amount to de facto acceptance that South Ossetia was a 
separate entity – perhaps the Joint Control Commission needs a chairman who 
could see the conflict aspect of the Š conflict. 
 
Alas, the charges that had been thrown Georgia¹s way for nearly a month – that 
Georgia reacted to South Ossetia¹s celebration of independence with mortar fire 
on the capital, Tskhinvali, on September 20 – was refuted by peacekeeping 
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investigators, but not by those originally making the claims, the South Ossetians 
and the Russians.  Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Yantsevich, chief-of-staff of the 
Joint Peacekeeping Forces, said that ³a landmine planted in a booby trap,² not 
mortar fire, caused the explosion in Tskhinvali. (28) 
 
In the meantime, demonstrating a remarkable degree of political savvy, Tbilisi is 
working to avoid the creation of any more breakaway zones, out of financial 
necessity, a la Abkhazia, South Ossetia, AjariaŠ and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The 
last TIA reported rumblings by the Armenian population in Javakheti that 
Georgian Armenians would work towards autonomy to regain control over the 
region in which they form a majority. (29)  Giorgi Khaindrava, Georgian State 
Minister for Separatist Conflicts, reported that the government will actively 
encourage the return of Meskhetian Turks, who were deported in large numbers 
during the Stalin era from the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti.  Khaindrava already 
has met with representatives of local Meskhetian Turk communities in Central 
Asia and southern Russia, and plans to visit similar groups in Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan. (30) 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Uzbekistan: Andijan 'trial' winds down & The crackdown continues 
On 20 September, the trial of 15 'Islamic militants', accused of instigating the 
Andijan rebellion (in May of this year), began in Tashkent. All 15 defendants 
pleaded guilty during the Supreme Court's first session. (1) Events both in and 
surrounding the trial showed that the Uzbek government was using the process 
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for a wider, more sinister purpose–namely a lock-down of the country–than 
simply to establish the culpability of the defendants. 
 
Two weeks before the trial started, President Islam Karimov initiated by decree a 
massive military call-up. Contrary to usual procedure, conscripts who had 
completed their required service would not to be released, but would be posted 
to reserve units. Moreover, all citizens not immediately drafted by the call up but 
who were judged eligible for service would similarly be posted to reserve units. 
Finally, commanders were advised that for the foreseeable future, all units were 
to be kept "combat ready."  
 
At the same time as its military was being placed on indefinite alert status, the 
Uzbek government also was carrying out a massive campaign against journalists 
and human rights campaigners, both Uzbek and Western, designed to discredit 
them and force them to flee the country. On 13 September, the government 
issued a statement claiming that the Western media were guilty of "unleashing an 
information war" against Uzbekistan. (2)  Human Rights Watch in the same week 
reported that 15 rights activists had fled the country, while a further 11 had been 
arrested by the National Security Service. (3) 
 
In presenting the government's case at trial, the Uzbek prosecutor painted a 
picture of a nation under threat. He alleged that the Andijan rebellion had been 
carried out by Islamic militants, trained by Chechens at camps in Kyrgyzstan, 
funded by the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (as well as other media 
outlets) and by the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent. The aim of the alleged militants 
was to use Uzbekistan as a base for the creation of a world-wide Islamic 
caliphate. (4) The Uzbek government's argument seems to be that these 
³threats² serve ex-post-facto to justify its pre-trial actions, and to validate its 
actions against opposition figures and the media in the last few months. 
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On 22 October, Uzbek Security forces arrested Sanjar Umarov, leader of the 
Sunshine Coalition, a prominent opposition group. (5) Umarov is a well-known 
businessman, apparently with "ties to the west." (6) In June of this year, Umarov 
called on President Karimov to dissolve the cabinet and appoint new and 
"progressive" officials. He also stated that if the Sunshine Coalition could "win the 
people's trust," he might run against Karimov in Presidential polls slated for 2007. 
(7) Days before his arrest, Umarov apparently issued a statement directed at the 
Parliament calling for Deputies to begin talks with the opposition without 
Karimov's blessing if necessary. (8) At the same time, he sent an open letter to 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (then visiting Uzbekistan), expressing 
the Sunshine Coalition's desire to resolve the current "political crisis" in 
Uzbekistan. (9) Press reports on Umarov's arrest indicate that he recently 
returned from a trip to the United States where he was seeking financial and 
political support for the Sunshine Coalition and its reform proposals. (10) Mr. 
Umarov is not the only opposition figure to have been targeted since the events 
in Andijan. Human Rights Watch recently was notified that Yelena Urlayeva, a 
senior member of the Free Farmers—a group also calling for economic and 
political reform was arrested in late August. An Uzbek court in closed session 
recently declared her insane. According to the sentence, Urlayeva is to undergo 
"psychiatric treatment," which will involve forcible restraint and the administration 
of psychotropic drugs. (11) 
 
Government actions against the media have been equally effective: on 26 
October, the BBC World Service announced that its Uzbek offices would be 
closed for the foreseeable future, and its correspondents withdrawn, as a direct 
result of a campaign of "harassment and intimidation," which have made it 
impossible for the organization to "report on events in the country." (12) 
Reportedly, the next targets are Deutsche Welle, and the Associated Press. (13) 
Taken together, the Uzbek government's actions amount to an attempt to purge 
the country of 'undesirable' influences. 
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Early in October, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried held a series of 
talks with Karimov. Fried noted that unless the Uzbek government cooperated 
fully in all areas including democratic reforms, the U.S. would be forced to "draw 
conclusions." (14) On 26 October, during closing arguments, Anvar Nabiyev, 
Deputy Prosecutor took the death penalty off the table, instead asking the court 
to sentence each of the Andijan defendants to a 15-20 year prison term. (15) 
This move clearly represents President Karimov's attempt to ³step back from the 
brink² in terms of relations with the United States. However misguided this belief 
might be, Karimov hopes that the fig leaf of ³leniency² will prevent the United 
States from drawing "conclusions" and severing not only diplomatic, but also 
financial and military aid  (not withstanding the imminent closure of K2) ties with 
his regime. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Dance With The devil, and he won't let go! 
In the last six weeks, Kyrgyzstan has witnessed the assassination or murder of 
two high-profile Parliamentary Deputies. On 21 September, Bayaman 
Erkinbayev, an ally of President Kurmanbek Bakiev, was shot and killed in 
Central Bishkek. Bakiev's reaction was to allege that Erkinbayev's murder had 
been possible only because the latter's bodyguards had been arrested by the 
Interior Ministry for unspecified reasons, making him an easy target. (16) The 
Interior Ministry's ³collusion² in Erkinbayev's death meant, so claimed Bakiev, 
that "law enforcement agencies everywhere must be purged." (17) This 
statement, given Prime Minister Feliks Kulov's intimate relationship with the 
Kyrgyz Security Forces—has to be viewed as a direct attack on the Prime 
Minister. It seems possible that the Bakiev-Kulov rapprochement, formed in the 
immediate aftermath of Kyrgyzstan's ³Tulip Revolution² might be coming to an 
end. 
 
On 19 October, a riot erupted at Novo-Pokrovka prison near Bishkek. Inmates at 
the facility—one described as having a "strict regime"–were demanding improved 
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conditions. During the course of the riot, two prisoners were killed, allegedly 
because they were acting as informants for the prison warden and 
administration. (18) Rioting apparently became so severe that the guards were 
forced to leave the facility. The next day, rioting erupted at another prison—
Moldovanovka—near Bishkek. 
 
In response to this riot, the Kyrgyz government dispatched two officials: 
Parliamentary Deputy Tynchbek Akmatbayev (Head of a Parliamentary 
Committee on Defense and Security) and Ikmatulla Polotov (Head of the Main 
Penitentiary Department) to the jail to negotiate with the prisoners. When they 
arrived at the prison, their bodyguards, as is standard procedure under Kyrgyz 
law, surrendered their side-arms to prison guards. At this point, prisoners 
apparently overwhelmed the guards, seized the surrendered weapons, and took 
the two delegates hostage. (19) In the process of taking hostages, Akmatbayev 
was shot and killed, while Polotov was seriously wounded. In an attempt to 
resolve the situation, Prime Minister Feliks Kulov traveled to Moldovanovka, 
where he successfully negotiated Polotov's release, as well as the surrender of 
Akmatbayev's body. Six days later, Polotov died of his wounds in a Bishkek 
hospital. (20) 
 
Akmatbayev's death resulted in a series of protests in Bishkek. The protestors 
alleged that Kulov was responsible for Akmatbayev's death, and demanded his 
resignation. A central figure in the demonstrations was Akmatbayev's brother 
Rysbek. Rysbek Akmatbayev is a "legendary" figure in Kyrgyzstan. Allegedly a 
mafia "kingpin," Rysbek was a fugitive from the Akaev regime for several years. 
Facing murder, embezzlement, racketeering, kidnapping, and other assorted 
charges, he agreed to a deal with the Kyrgyz Prosecutor-General in the 
aftermath of Akaev's overthrow to stand trial. He was to be allowed to remain at 
large on payment of bail and on condition that he sign a pledge not to leave the 
country. (21)  
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Several disturbing details have emerged about Tynchbek Akmatbayev's death, 
and the resultant protests. First, one of the prisoners at Moldovanovka prison 
was a Chechen, Aziz Batukaev. Apparently, Batukaev had a long-running feud 
with Rysbek Akmatbayev, resulting from the latter's (alleged) murder of Batukev's 
brother-in-law in 2003. (22) As such, Tynchbek Akmatbayev's ³assassination² 
carries all the "hallmarks of an underworld-related blood feud." (23)  Secondly, 
the "protestors" challenging Kulov apparently constituted no-one but "friends and 
relatives" of the murdered deputy. (24) The anti-Kulov protests are placed in a 
whole new light, if viewed through the prism of serious allegations, which recently 
have arisen about the March revolution. According to Tolekan Ismailova, Head of 
Citizens Against Corruption, a Kyrgyz NGO, "funding from underworld figures" 
was central in bringing protestors to the streets of Jalal-Abad, Osh and Bishkek 
for the demonstrations and riots that caused President Akaev's downfall. (25) 
These allegations, if true would explain the new Kyrgyz government's readiness 
to release a figure (Rysbek Akmatbayev) widely portrayed as one of the country's 
most senior and powerful crime bosses. 
 
President Bakiev's reaction to the anti-Kulov protests was two-fold. First, the 
President's criticism of the Security Services over Erkinbayev's death ceased. 
Instead, Bakiev stated that he fully trusted the Prime Minister and endorsed his 
continued service.  (26) A day later, he met with Rysbek Akmatbayev and his 
supporters to promise a full investigation into the deaths at the prison. Upon 
receipt of this promise, Akmatbayev apparently agreed to suspend 
demonstrations pending the outcome of an inquiry. (27) The results of this inquiry 
are to be released on 15 November. 
 
One of President Bakiev's central campaign promises was to end government 
corruption. Anti-corruption rhetoric has continued since the election, most visibly 
in his initiation of an inquiry into the Akaev family finances, and, for Western 
observers, in his September 16 speech at the High Level Plenary Meeting of the 
60th Session of the UN General Assembly. (28) 
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If Tolekan Ismailova's allegations are true, Bakiev owes the Presidency to two 
fundamentally opposed parties–organized crime and the Security Services; 
effectively, he dealt with the devil. Kulov, as their former commander, commands 
the loyalty of the country's two most powerful law enforcement/security organs 
(the National Security Service and the Interior Ministry). Due to his position, 
Kulov is, if not in name then de facto, the person in charge of anti-corruption 
operations. It is because of his position that Akmatbayev's family is demanding 
Kulov's dismissal.  Without Kulov's (and therefore the Security Services) support, 
Bakiev's position is untenable: it was only through the introduction of the Security 
Services that the government was able to restore order in the prisons, (29) and 
stop the rioting in the aftermath of the revolution. On the other hand, without the 
financial support of underground organizations, Bakiev would likely not have won 
the Presidency. Should either party remove its endorsement, Bakiev's 
Presidency would likely collapse. Given the current climate in the country, it is 
understandable that the President is attempting to play to both sides of the 
gallery. How this crisis is resolved by Bakiev—or whether it is taken out of his 
hands—remains to be seen. 
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UKRAINE 
Kryvorizhstal: One large step forwardŠ and then? 
The unquestionable success of Ukraine¹s $4.8 billion auction of the Kryvorizhstal 
steel plant provided a much-needed boost to President Viktor Yushchenko last 
week.  But by highlighting the potential benefits of ³reprivatization,² the sale also 
could create problems for Yushchenko as his party prepares for March¹s 
parliamentary elections.  
 
The president has been under seemingly constant criticism over the last several 
months.  This criticism particularly has swirled around the dismissal of the Yulia 
Tymoshenko¹s government, charges that his aides were involved in corrupt 
activities (charges he strenuously rejects), and the dismissal of the Prosecutor-
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General who had been assigned to follow-up on these charges.  Even more, he 
has been accused of ³betraying² the ideals of the Orange Revolution by signing a 
³Memorandum of Understanding² with his former presidential election opponent 
Viktor Yanukovich, and by holding a series of meetings with businessmen he 
accused during the presidential campaign of criminal activity.  
 
But Kryvorizhstal¹s sale – with a price that exceeded all expectations – marked a 
major coup, and signaled a break with previous privatization methods designed 
to benefit those well-connected to the government.  The plant, which was 
previously handed to former President Leonid Kuchma¹s son-in-law for just $800 
million, was sold using the most ³Western² of rules.  Instead of a privatization 
arranged behind closed doors, or held under a system designed to favor one 
bidder, this sale was held live on three television channels using criteria 
approved by international advisors and organizations.  Shell companies and off-
shore bank accounts were disallowed.  Specific payment, labor and capital 
improvement requirements were demanded.   And a live auction on television 
illustrated that the highest bidder did, in fact, win.  In every sense, the resale of 
Kryvorizhstal epitomized what the Orange Revolution was about; it went to the 
heart of protestors¹ demands for fairness, truth and equality.  
 
Even more, the sale represented the greatest success of the ³team² that led the 
revolution.  It was, after all, Yulia Tymoshenko¹s government, with the support of 
Yushchenko, that so resolutely pressed for Kryvorizhstal¹s return to the state and 
subsequent resale.  Preparation for the live television auction was one of 
Tymoshenko¹s last duties as prime minister.  ³All channels will carry a live relay 
from the auditorium where an open auction will be conducted, where they will be 
raising cards,² she said, ³and you will see what could have been done in our 
country [under President Kuchma]... if privatization had been at least 50 per cent 
honest.² (1) 
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But, while Kryvorizhstal is a first, it is also a last.  It is the last major project of the 
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko revolution tandem.  And it is, according to Prime 
Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, the last (and only) resale of questionably acquired 
state assets.  ³There will be no reprivatization,² he said during one of his first 
public appearance after his appointment to replace Tymoshenko. (2) The 
statement was intended, no doubt, to reassure large investors who were 
unnerved by Tymoshenko¹s wide-ranging reprivatization plans.  This lack of 
investor confidence contributed to a slowdown in economic growth, as did 
repeated attacks from those whose property was thought to have been 
improperly acquired. 
 
However, righting the wrongs of the Kuchma administration was one of 
Yushchenko¹s promises during the protests that led to his current position, and 
removing what are seen as improperly acquired assets from ³oligarchs² remains 
popular in Ukraine.  Suggestions from Yekhanurov that ³there will be a 
negotiating table² and ³there will be out-of-court settlements² may satisfy certain 
investors, but to many Ukrainians, these words may sound like euphemisms for 
³back-room deals.²  How to balance himself effectively between the concerns of 
those who supported him during the revolution and large investors – who are 
necessary for the growth of Ukraine¹s economy – is one of the most important 
challenges facing Viktor Yushchenko.  
 
Tymoshenko, in her new role as Yushchenko¹s opponent, has made her position 
clear; her message remains the same as it was during the revolution.   A 
statement released last week by her party reads,  ³The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 
recognizes the inviolability of private property, but it will never recognize the 
inviolability of what was stolen.²  Moreover, ³We denounce reconciliation between 
the government and oligarchic clans,² and ³We will not allow any individual 
approaches or amicable agreements that boil down to pure corruption.²  The 
statement also called for the resale of the Nikopol aluminum plant, which was 
 40 
ruled in court to have been illegally privatized almost immediately prior to 
Tymshenko¹s dismissal. (3) 
 
Yushchenko has shown little interest in ³rocking the boat² by continuing with the 
Nikopol resale, or with the resale of other enterprises identified during 
Tymoshenko¹s time as premier.  He has been steadfastly supported in this 
position by Western investors and economic analysts who suggest that 
reprivatization causes instability in financial markets.  In fact, it did in Ukraine, 
primarily due to a lack of a well-defined overall plan agreed to by all political 
forces involved.  The number of companies to be reprivatized and the criteria for 
reprivatization were never clear.  
 
However, these same investors and analysts overwhelmingly applauded the 
transparency and success of the Kryvorizhstal sale – a sale that was supported 
by all government officials, based on a clear plan for its disposition.  One 
wonders, then, if a limited, well-defined and coherently articulated general resale 
strategy, to include the most egregiously privatized plants, would not be met 
positively in the end.  Tymoshenko has signaled her support for such a plan and 
undoubtedly will push for it during the campaign. 
 
Yushchenko¹s response could effect significantly the outcome of the election.  
Currently, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Yushchenko¹s People¹s Union Our 
Ukraine are polling within three percentage points of each other – usually with 
Tymoshenko slightly ahead.  As the two former Orange Revolution leaders battle, 
former presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich has seen his Party of Regions 
move slightly ahead of both.  His and Tymoshenko¹s successes do not bode well 
for Yushchenko¹s chance of maintaining control of the government in April – 
when political reform will mean that the parliament, not the president, forms the 
majority of the cabinet. 
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The success of Kryvorizhstal¹s resale must be applauded.  But it highlights the 
need for Yushchenko to develop a plan to deal with questionably attained 
property that meets the demands not only of investors but also of his voters.  
Responding only to investors, or to oligarchs seen to be protecting their property, 
provides ample fodder for Tymoshenko.  For her part, the former prime minister 
now may point to Kryvorizhstal as the primary evidence of the potential success 
of her privatization initiatives.   
 
Prime Minister Yekhanurov in the U.S. 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov visited the U.S. on November 1 and 
2.  He was accompanied by Economics Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, as they 
attempted to tackle several extremely difficult issues in U.S.-Ukrainian relations.  
 
First and foremost, Ukraine is looking for the U.S. to back its request to enter the 
World Trade Organization in December.  The U.S. is one of eight countries still to 
sign necessary bilateral agreements with Ukraine, and privately, U.S. officials 
have been less than enthusiastic about Ukraine¹s chances to win approval for 
WTO entry this year.   
 
Officials point primarily to a lack of progress by Ukraine on the economic reforms 
necessary to meet WTO standards.  These officials suggest that President Viktor 
Yushchenko has found it difficult since he came into office to win passage of 
necessary laws.  Since the confirmation of the new government, this difficulty has 
risen to a level of near impossibility as Yushchenko¹s always tenuous 
parliamentary support has fractured.    
 
Even more, despite vigorous activity by the Foreign Ministry, and despite 
numerous statements from the president calling for support for Ukraine¹s WTO 
entry, necessary legislation has received only limited attention from the new 
government and the parliament.  While members of the previous government 
routinely attended parliamentary sessions when relevant bills were being 
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debated and routinely spoke to the press about the importance of them, the 
current government has not. 
 
The president himself, however, recently increased his interaction substantially 
with parliamentary factions, and on November 1, the parliament approved two 
out of the eight bills that are absolutely essential if Ukraine is to have any chance 
in December.  It was the first WTO-related legislative success since July, before 
legislators left for their summer recess. 
 
Action on the other six necessary bills has been less of a success for the 
government, and does not bode well for the country¹s WTO hopes.  On 18 
October, in particular, a bill that would eliminate the export duty on cattle and 
halve the duty on leather products mustered only 108 votes in favor out of the 
necessary 226.  (4) The government apparently was not represented at the 
debate.  The bill is being required by Australia and the U.S. before they will sign 
bilateral agreements on Ukraine¹s WTO entry.  
 
Many analysts suggest that even with more intensive lobbying, parliament would 
not pass all of the necessary bills this close to an election.  (5)  Regardless, this 
apparent lack of progress led WTO Director-Secretary General Pascal Lamy to 
suggest on 17 October, ³Neither Russia nor Ukraine will be able to complete all 
negotiations regarding entrance by the end of the current year.  They should wait 
a bit.²  (6)  
 
Not only is Lamy¹s statement disturbing because it seems to confirm that the 
country will miss an important Western integration target set by Yushchenko, but 
also because he seemed automatically to attach Ukraine¹s entry to Russia¹s.  
Joint entry of Ukraine and Russia next year, during which Russia will be given 
the opportunity to influence negatively Ukraine¹s bilateral agreements in 
negotiations, would be both a financial and psychological blow to the country¹s 
attempts to disentangle itself from Russia¹s sphere of influence.  
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U.S. officials will need to decide if a political agreement allowing Ukraine to enter 
the WTO with conditions still to be fulfilled (as was done with China), would be 
more beneficial geopolitically than forcing Ukraine to wait to join the WTO with 
Russia.  The former would go a long way toward influencing WTO officials like 
Lamy.  Yushchenko and Yekhanurov obviously are hoping that U.S. officials will 
support just such a scenario. 
 
Similarly, Yekhanurov continues to push the U.S. hard to fulfill its previous 
commitment to work with Ukraine to develop an alternative to Russian nuclear 
fuel.  
 
The U.S. announced this year that it will not complete its funding for a major 
project designed to allow Ukraine to procure nuclear fuel from Western, non-
Russian sources.  The country currently secures about 50 percent of its 
electricity needs through its nuclear power plants.  But the Soviet design of its 
plants has meant that the country has depended entirely on Russia for supply of 
its fuel;  it has been unable to integrate the alternative composition of Western 
nuclear fuel rods into its reactors. 
 
However, in 1998, to compensate Ukraine for its agreement to withdraw from 
participation in the construction of Iran¹s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the U.S. 
initiated a project to develop non-Russian nuclear fuel that would work in 
Ukraine¹s plants.   The project also was thought to have potential implications for 
other nuclear plants throughout the former Soviet Union.  
 
In August of this year, Westinghouse inserted the first four of such nuclear rods 
into one of Ukraine¹s nuclear reactors, and seems to have had some success.  
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At the time, the government announced that nuclear fuel diversification would 
allow Ukraine to develop far greater energy independence.  
 
But the U.S. has removed the final funding that would support Westinghouse¹s 
production of 42 additional fuel rods, in order to actually implement the project.  
In a letter that has recently been made public by the Action Ukraine Report, U.S. 
Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman wrote, ³Reduced levels of funding to the 
International Nuclear Safety Program recently forced the Department of Energy 
to reduce the scope of its assistance work.  The reduction impacted the Ukraine 
Nuclear Fuel Quantification Project and funding for the core reload is not 
currently available.² (7) 
 
The withdrawal of funding places the entire project in jeopardy, and could cause 
Ukraine, out of financial necessity, to abandon its nuclear fuel diversification 
plans.  This would be more than a shame, as diversification of its nuclear fuel is 
the easiest and clearest method for the country to develop a limited level of 
energy independence.  While development of new gas pipeline systems, and 
exploration of new oil sources, would cost billions of dollars, the final stage of 
Ukraine¹s nuclear fuel diversification reportedly would cost $15 million and would 
have significant geopolitical implications in the region.  The final cost would place 
the project¹s total spending at $65 million.  This means that without this final $15 
million, the previous expenditures may have been in vain – a significant waste of 
U.S. funding.   
  
In a letter to Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, Senator Arlen Specter 
wrote, ³While I have significant concerns from a policy standpoint of prematurely 
terminating a commitment to an ally which took action at the request of our 
government in order to advance security in that region, I am additionally 
concerned over what appears to be substantial expenditures resulting in no final 
useful product.² (8) 
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Specter¹s letter and others like it from Ukrainian officials appear to have had no 
effect.  Yekhanurov undoubtedly hopes that a discussion of this topic in person 
will produce better results.  If not, Ukraine will be forced to backtrack on previous 
statements to Russia that in the coming years it would no longer need its nuclear 
fuel.  While in Washington, Yekhanurov pushed for the U.S. to recognize Ukraine 
as having a market economy and for the abolition of archaic Soviet era trade 
restrictions contained in the Jackson-Vannik amendment of the 1974 Trade Act. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Everything old is new again 
Moldovan and Transnistrian representatives sat down at the negotiating table last 
week for the first time in 15 months.  And for the first time ever, they were joined 
not only by the OSCE and the so-called ³guarantor² countries of Russia and 
Ukraine, but also by representatives of the United States and European Union.  
The negotiation format will now be called 5 + 2, because the U.S. and EU 
technically will take part only as observers.  Before the talks, the OSCE 
suggested that the new scenario might provide a ³fresh impetus for finding a 
lasting agreement.² (9)  In reality, both sides in the Transnistria dispute seem 
more strident than ever, as the infusion of new negotiating parties seems to have 
led only to new vitriol. 
 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, who has strenuously objected to recent 
settlement proposals from Ukraine, preceded the negotiations with several hard 
volleys aimed at Russia, and obviously intended to undermine any potential 
support the U.S., EU or Ukraine might have for Russian propositions. 
 
Voronin charged that his government had uncovered a major arms deal – 
presumably brokered by Russia – that provided Saddam Hussein¹s Iraq with 
weapons produced in Transnistria.  "We have sent to Russia a file with 
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documents on the directions of arms exports from Transnistria,² he said.  
³According to the data available with us, 13 Transnistrian industrial enterprises 
manufacture armaments continuously. We have a document from the 
Presidential Office of Saddam Hussein's certifying that weapons from 
Transnistria used to be imported to Iraq. Now we are scrutinizing this." (10)  He 
did not produce copies of documents or provide any further details.  
 
Earlier, Moldovan officials had repeated previous charges that Russian weapons 
and ammunition were being transported from Russia¹s compound in Transnistria 
to Chechnya and North Ossetia. 
 
Voronin also suggested that a previous agreement in 2003 had been scuttled at 
the last minute by Russian insistence on maintaining a military base in 
Transnistria for 20 years.  Even more, he charged that the leaders of the 
breakaway region, including self-styled president Igor Smirnov, ³have their hands 
steeped in blood.²  He said his administration was in the process of completing a 
list of Smirnov¹s political opponents in Transnistria who have disappeared or died 
mysteriously.   (11) 
 
Such accusations were made by Voronin in the past, but never in such an 
unambiguous, forceful manner.  This particularly strong response may be have 
been provoked at least partially by the settlement plan recently offered by 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko.  Moldovan officials have complained that 
this plan isolates them and largely gives in to many demands from both 
Transnistria and Russia.  In particular, the plan is silent on the removal of 
Russian troops from Transnistria, and calls for elections ³soon² in the separatist 
republic.  
 
Such elections, held in what is recognized throughout the world as an unfree, 
dictatorial atmosphere would do little, according to Moldovan officials, but 
legitimize Smirnov¹s regime.  The plan, which was rhetorically welcomed by 
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weary OSCE representatives, is likely providing significant impetus for Voronin¹s 
increasingly forceful statements. (12) Isolation, after all, breeds either a fight for a 
staked position or a flight from it.  Voronin obviously has chosen to fight.  Given 
the opinion of Moldovan voters, he has little choice. 
 
Russia and Transnistria, of course, reacted angrily to Voronin¹s charges.  
Transnistria¹s Vitaly Ignatyev called them ³groundless,² while Russian Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov said suggestions that Russia was transferring 
Transnistrian weapons to Chechnya were ³nonsense.²  He said, ³We are 
responsible for our military bases in the territory of the Dniester (sic) region.  I 
want to stress that Russian weapons won¹t be removed from the region.²  (13) 
 
That statement underscores the biggest issue faced by negotiators.  Even though 
Moscow has signed numerous agreements to withdraw its troops and weaponry 
from Moldova, including several OSCE-brokered agreements, Russia has not 
fulfilled these commitments.  Previously, its leaders presented a litany of 
questionable justifications to explain the delay in removal of troops.  In recent 
months, they have abandoned all pretext and stated simply that the troops will 
not be withdrawn.  
 
On 29 July, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, ³Our troops will not be 
withdrawn from there until all of Russia's property is evacuated to the Russian 
territory."  Further, the troops, he said, are there ³under the mandate determined 
by the two sides of the conflict - Moldova and the [self-proclaimed] Dniester 
Republic."  (14)  
 
In actuality, Moldova has said repeatedly that it does not want these troops – a 
fact that Russia must have understood when it signed an OSCE agreement to 
remove them.  (15) 
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Regardless, Ivanov¹s statement implies that the troops will not be removed until a 
full settlement on the status of the Transnistrian region and its ³property² is 
reached.  ³One can hardly imagine,² Voronin responded, ³that a political 
settlement is a task for the Defense Ministry.² (16)  
 
Given everything, it is not surprising then that during the talks last week, little 
progress appears to have been made.  The OSCE once again announced that it 
would not recognize elections to be held in December in Transnistria – in partial 
fulfillment, Smirnov has said, of the Yushchenko plan.  Ukraine¹s view on the 
elections is unclear, but any suggestion that the poll, held in what the OSCE has 
called an ³undemocratic² environment, represents the will of the people would be 
a major blow to Moldova and future settlement talks. 
 
Moldova and Transnistria also agreed to exchange information on troops and 
armaments by 1 December, and that Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE would 
develop a plan to monitor Transnistria¹s military plants.  If this were to occur, it 
would make a considerable contribution to calming tensions between Moldova 
and Transnistria over alleged arms production and distribution.  Like all accords 
in this process, however, there is a long path between agreement and 
implementation; more often than not, implementation is never achieved.   
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